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COMPI HENT
POLICE DISCRETION AND TRAFFIC
LAW ENFORCEMENT
We are constantly reminded that death and destruction in automobile
accidents impose a continuing and increasing demand for laws that will
save our citizens from themselves on the highways. It is undeniable
that traffic safety is extremely important, and that the highway traffic
toll is a cause for great public concern. It has been characterized as a
problem of public health, having attained epidemic proportions.' The
following quotation indicates the magnitude of the problem:
Traffic deaths and injuries in the United States during the first two years
of the Korean war were much greater than the American casualties at the
front. There have been over three times as many deaths and twenty-five
times as many injuries in traffic as there were on the battlefield. The
accumulation of accidental deaths during little more than fifty years of
use of automobiles has been over a million, which is greater than all the
deaths from war in this country since 1776.2
Although the annual traffic fatalities remained fairly constant at
about 37,000 for nearly two decades, they passed 40,000 (40,900) for
the first time in 1962.' Moreover, for every fatality, there are more
than 125 non-fatal injuries." The effect on young people is particularly
severe: in a recent ten year period 42% of all deaths in the 13-25 age
bracket were attributable to traffic accidents.5 It has been estimated
that the direct economic cost of traffic accidents was $5.3 billions in a
recent year.6 This is not our problem alone; it is a world-wide problem:
World Health Organization statistics list more than 100,000 traffic
deaths annually, reported from forty-seven member states Stated
more dramatically, "Every 14 hours-on the average-someone dies
in Washington State traffic. Nearly 100 persons are injured each day.
I Moynihan, Public Health and Traffic Safety, 51 J. CRiM. L., C. & P.S. 93 (1960).
2 BEUTEL, SOME POTENTIALITIES OF EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AS A NEW
BRANCH OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 91 (1957).
3 Miller, The 1962 Traffic Story, Traffic Safety, March 1963, pp. 6,7; Moynihan,
supra note 1.
4O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 299, 306 (1963).
5 Hearings on H.R. 903, HR. 1341, H.R. 2446 Before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Interstate & Foreign. Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 143 (1961).6 NORMAN, ROAD TRAFFIc ACCIDENTS-EPIDEMOLOGY, CONTROL AND PREVENTION 19(1962).
7 Id. at 9.
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In 1962 alone, nearly 85,000 persons were injured by automobiles
somewhere in the state."8 Traffic accidents take a life every ten to
fifteen minutes, and they cost us $250 each second.9
As dark as the picture is now, future prospects are even worse. Of
thirty-one states that publish such statistics, seventeen reported an
increase in traffic injuries of more than 100% in the 1948-57 decade.
Florida showed a 486% increase. New York's actual injuries increased
125o and the rate of injuries per one-hundred million traffic miles
increased 44%.1o The scene is set for the upward trend to continue.
There were seventy-six million automobiles operating in 1961, and this
figure is expected to swell to one-hundred and fourteen million in the
next fifteen years.11
But, society, in its desire to secure our future safety on the highways,
must not be driven by these alarming statistics to sacrifice personal
freedoms. Although the first concern with traffic safety laws is to
increase the motorist's chance for survival, these traffic laws, and the
enforcement of them, create other problems that can undermine values
fundamental to our society. This comment will discuss some of these
problems, and shall suggest a possible course for our legislative bodies
that may best effect greater traffic safety, and at the same time pre-
serve the other values. For the sake of comprehension and comprehen-
siveness, this discussion will be confined to traffic speed limits.
Speed limits are legislatively established and are often unreasonable.
People refuse to obey unreasonable speed limits, and the police will not
enforce them. However, the police do not permit motorists to select
the safe speed: the police enforce what they believe is a safe and
reasonable speed limit. When they do this they replace the legislature
and the city councils as lawmakers. -
Police lawmaking creates, actually or potentially, several problems.
It may breed disrespect and contempt for the law in the minds of many
of our citizens. It may constitute the first step on a short path to a
police state. Depending on its course and scope, it may violate the
due process and/or equal protection provisions of the United States
Constitution. It may produce important effects in the negligence per se
area of tort law.
8 Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 16, 1963, p. 1.
O U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE (Bureau of Public Roads) REPORT, THE FEDmAL ROLE IN
HIGHWAY SMErY, H.R. Doc. No. 93, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1959).
lo Moynihan, sepra note 1, at 94.
21 NAT oNAL SAFTY CoUNCHL, ACCIDENT FAcTs 40 (1962 ed.y.
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We shall seek to discover the extent to which these problems are real
ones, what has been done about them, and what can be done about
them. Because legislative bodies, enforcement agencies, governmental
administrative units, judges, safety councils and automobile clubs,
among others, devote much time and effort to these problems, they
provide a realistic and useful source for investigation of traffic speed
laws and their implications. Thus, many of the conclusions in this
article were formed after extensive interviews from these "field
sources.'
2
Legislatures, in fits of misdirected zeal inspired by the disclosure of
grim statistics, such as those quoted at the outset, have frequently
established speed limits that are unrealistically and unreasonably
low." A well-known experience of the past decade demonstrates the
inadvisability of "too-low" speed limts. A crusading Connecticut gov-
ernor enforced a widely publicized "crackdown" on speeders. During
the year before he 'declared war on automobile speeding,' Connecticut
state police issued 372 speeding citations. In the first year of the pro-
gram 10,055 citations were issued. When all fines had been paid and
all victims buried, statistics indicated that the chief result of the vig-
orous "traffic safety" campaign was to increase the Connecticut driver's
risk of death on the highways by 8% for every mile he traveled. 4
Drivers invariably refuse to obey unreasonable speed limits, and
police officers will not, or cannot, enforce them. 5 Regardless of the
attitude of police authorities toward unreasonably low speed limits,
12 The author is grateful for the assistance rendered by the following persons, both
in the granting of personal interviews and the furnishing of helpful reports and pam-
phlets: State Senator Nat Washington, Ephrata, chairman of the Washington State
Legislature's Interim Committee on Highways; Seattle City Council President Clar-
ence Massart (who served as chairman of the Council's Public Safety Committee when
the revised 1963 Seattle Traffic Code was enacted); the Honorable Vernon Towne,
Judge of the Municipal Traffic Court of Seattle; Lieutenant Ranney, Washington
State Patrol, Olympia; Captain Ed Coming, Seattle Police Department; Mr. Rex
Still, Traffic Engineer, Washington State Highway Commission; Mr. Myron Mitchell,
Traffic Engineer, City of Seattle; Mr. Tom Darlington, executive director of the
legislature's interim committee on highways; Mr. Ray Norwood, manager Seattle-
King County Safety Council; and Mr. Russell Van Rooy, assistant general manager
of the Washington Automobile Club (American Automobile Association). Although
many persons rendered invaluable assistance, the author assumes complete and un-
divided responsibility for all views expressed in this Comment.
13 For example, see REPORT, supra note 9, at 3, 5, and Schwartz, The Case for Fast
Drivers, Harper's, Sept. 1963, p. 65.
14 O'Connell, supra note 4, at 308.
15 Most drivers already drive "at speeds they consider safe for the highway and the
prevailing driving conditions," and almost universally ignore compulsory attempts to
slow them down to an unreasonably low speed limit. Smith & Lecraw, Travel Speeds
and Posted Speeds in Three States, 2 TRAFFIC Q. 101 (1948). "We know that 360
of the automobiles on state roads are always going faster than fifty miles per hour."
Moynihan, supra note 1, at 94.
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restricted manpower prevents effective enforcement when a majority,
or a large minority, of drivers, ignore the posted speeds.16 However,
the police will not abandon the designation of speed limits to the whim
of passing motorists; they will draw the line at some point-the point
they believe to be both safe and enforceable. This exercise of police
discretion to determine what the effective speed limit will be constitutes
a police usurpation of a legislative function. It is undeniable that such
police discretion is exercised.17 Necessity is the alleged justification.
If the necessity for police discretion exists, and that contention will
be examined later, then the traffic safety benefits derived must be
balanced against the other problems that accompany police discretion.
The average motorist does not consult the statute book before setting
out on the highway, but he becomes aware of the statutory command
through the posted speed limit. He then discovers, from common
observation, that the speed limit actually enforced by the police may
be higher than that established by the legislature. The legislative law
becomes meaningless; the motorist becomes concerned with "what he
can get away with." Disrespect for the law, bred in this manner, is a
sure sign of ill health in a democratic society." Although motorists thus
become "lawbreakers," it is doubtful that they believe they are doing
anything wrong, and they certainly cannot be categorized as revolu-
tionaries. " However, this observation does not lessen the problem, it
merely emphasizes it. If, in breaking the law, citizens recognized that
they were acting contrary to the law, its supremacy would remain
unchallenged, even though occasionally unobeyed. Instead, the motorist
does not recognize the legislative pronouncement as law at all, but
regards the law as being that which issues from "the policeman's night
stick.""0 It is not uncommon for an irate defendant to protest to a
traffic judge that he has been wrongfully charged with a speeding
violation because he was exceeding the posted limit by only X miles
Is Coming, Towne, and Norwood, supra note 12. Mr. Norwood suggests that for
optimum traffic enforcement in Seattle, the present 800 man police force should be
virtually doubled.
17 E.g., engineering studies in Seattle reveal that prevailing speeds, i.e., the average,
on arterial streets, consistently exceed the posted speed limits. Mitchell, supra note 12.
18 Mueller, How to Increase Traffic Fatalities: A Useful Guide for Modern Leg-
islators and Traffic Courts, 60 CoLum. L. REv. 944, 946 (1960).
'
0 Wasserstrom, The Obligation to Obey the Law, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 780 (1963).
20 "The average nonreader of the statute book knows of the law what he knows of
ethics and custom, and for the rest, what he knows of prosecutions." (Emphasis added.)
Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Terma-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HAmv. L.
Ray. 40, 63 (1961).
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per hour, and "everybody knows that you can't get a ticket for doing
that."
2
What is the significance of this disrespect for the law? Perhaps its
effects do not extend beyond traffic laws; perhaps the motorist who
learns today that speed limits are synonymous with police enforcement
will not, for example, gear his income tax reporting to the rumored
effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the revenue agents, but will report in
compliance with the spirit, as well as the letter of the law. Some per-
sons closely associated with the traffic safety movement suggest that
this is the case. An American Automobile Association official suggested
that a motorist is a different creature from that same person when he
is not driving a car.22 He stated that people do not relate driving laws
and driving experiences to other laws and to other experiences. If this
is so, there may be no problem of disrespect for the law. If there is no
carry-over into other fields of law, and if traffic safety enforcement
can be best accomplished by allowing to the police a freer hand, the
harm is probably minimal. However, it is not certain that there is no
extension of the disrespect generated by the variance between traffic
laws and traffic law enforcement into other areas of law. A Safety
Council official suggests that there probably is such an extension." A
traffic judge concedes that there is a possibility of such an extension.24
Assuming that we wish to avoid general disrespect for the law, it
would be hard to find an area of law that provides more opportunity to
spread the pernicious disrespect than does that of speeding laws. First,
it seems unlikely that there is any generic classification of laws that
affects more citizens than do speeding laws. Virtually everyone beyond
the early years of adolescence is a motorist.25 In contrast, if disrespect
for the law were generated from some aspect of the administration of,
for example, laws relating to corporate reorganizations, only a small
fraction of the population would be affected. If there is a "spillover"
of disrespect from enforcement of highway speed laws, there is scarcely
a corner of the populace that would escape the deleterious influence.
Second, traffic speed laws frequently provide young people with their
first contact with the law, or even their first encounter with the concept
of authority beyond the home and the school. 6 It is undoubtedly to
society's disadvantage if the ascending generation's first impression of
2 1 Towne, supra note 12. 23 Norwood, supra note 12.
22 Van Rooy, supra note 12. 24 Towne, supra note 12.
25 See note 12, supra, and accompanying text, and see, generally, O'Connell, supra
note 4, REPORT, supra note 9 at 3, 5 and Schwartz, supra note 13.26 Judge Towne is particularly aware of this phenomenon. See note 12, supra.
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law as a living concept produces in their minds an equation of law
with police authority. The recently learned ideals of ordered liberty
and of governments of laws rather than governments of men will be
quickly forgotten. The ideals of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
will be thought of as mere romantic nonsense, and the real meaning
of law will be symbolized for them by a uniformed motorcycle police
officer.
If the disrespect for law bred in the enforcement of speed limits tran-
scends that field of law, the dangers to the democratic system are
apparent. The possibility that it does so transcend is great enough to
warrant concern, and is sufficient to suggest the elimination of the
source of disrespect: the exercise of police lawmaking.
"Police State" is a term of the greatest opprobrium and infamy to
Americans. It is antithetical to our most fundamental precepts, and
the Bill of Rights was designed to eliminate it from our working vocab-
ulary. Yet, it still exists in today's world. The Supreme Court continues
jealously to guard against its encroachment upon American lives.2 7
Substantial variation between enforced law and written law virtually
defines a "police state." Selected sections of the East German constitu-
tion that are inscribed on the wall of a West Berlin memorial dramat-
ically support this assertion. They purport to guarantee to all East
Germans freedom of movement and the right to live in the locale of
their choice, freedom of expression of opinions and of public congrega-
tion for that purpose, and freedom of election. Pictures surround these
inscriptions: of tanks dispersing crowds who had congregated to ex-
press freely their opinions, and of East German police shooting, on the
Berlin wall, an eighteen-year-old boy who sought to exercise his right
to freedom of movement.
Perhaps permitting the police to exercise discretion in traffic speed
enforcement will not build a Berlin wall tomorrow, but what of the day
after tomorrow?
Surely, it must be conceded at the outset that illegal or unauthorized con-
duct by public officials is a net evil, regardless of offsetting advantages.
It is that, if only because it breeds general disrespect for law. It is also
that because it leads to the unbridled and oppressive. So, too, it must be
conceded that discretion--even legally permissible discretion-involves
great hazard. It makes easy the arbitrary, the discriminatory, and the
oppressive. It produces inequality of treatment. It offers a fertile bed
27 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (involving police searches and




for corruption. It is conducive to the development of a police state-or,
at least, a police-minded state. (Emphasis added.) 28
In a recent article the problem was succinctly stated: "The police-
man's choice... if unwisely and needlessly expanded by inadequately
conceived legislative formulations, has serious... potential for impair-
ment of important values."2
Professor Goldstein has recognized that the lack of opportunity for
judicial supervision might allow unchecked police activity to lead to a
police state. He recently wrote,
[T]he police should operate in an atmosphere which exhorts and com-
mands them to invoke impartially all criminal laws .... If a criminal law
is ill-advised, poorly defined, or too costly to enforce .... [there should
be] pressures for legislative action. Responsibility for the enactment,
amendment and repeal of the criminal laws will not, then, be abandoned
to the whim of each police officer or department, but retained where it
belongs in a democracy-with elected representatives.3'
The need of society for enforcement of the laws for general protection
constantly must be balanced against the preservation of individual
rights and freedoms, and for avoiding the evils of a police state. While
many authors warn against the latter encroachments, police officials
assert that the courts overbalance the scales in favor of the criminals
by extending protections of individual rights far beyond any need for
them.3
It is common knowledge that police officers invoke typically broadly
worded "vagrancy" statutes to detain persons of whom they suspect
greater crimes, or to rid themselves of annoying or "undesirable"
persons."2 Similarly, police officers often invoke little-enforced traffic
laws to apprehend suspected criminals, "for a closer look." 3 A recent
Washington case34 curtailed that practice, but still the police press
for even-greater latitude in enforcement. Current examples include
proposals that will be submitted to the 1965 legislature, which would
28 Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHL L. REV. 427, 429
(1960).
29 Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75
HARV. L. REV. 904, 930 (1962).
30 Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L. J. 543, 586-87 (1960). See also,
Goldstein, supra at 575, n. 66 and accompanying text.
31 Corning, supra note 12.
32 Hall, The Law of Arrest In Relation to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U.
CHI. L. REv. 345, 368-70 (1936). The Washington vagrancy statute is RCW 9.87.010.
33 Corning, supra note 12.




allow police officers to institute random roadblocks and to administer
alcohol-blood tests to any motorist who is apprehended for a traffic
violation or who is involved in a traffic accident.3 5 Police actions and
proposals of this nature supply the breeding ground for a police state,
or at least for a police state atmosphere. It seems undesirable to afford
another opportunity, in speed limit enforcement, to encourage this
tendency.
In short, although the police departments may be commended for
their objectives of making life more safe and secure, we should none-
theless jealously guard our freedoms lest their enthusiasm overcome
and consume us. To do otherwise is to repeat the history of police rule
everywhere.
Police legislation may violate the equal protection and/or due proc-
ess clauses of the United States Constitution.
The Washington court held that a statute which granted county
prosecuting attorneys the discretion to charge for either a felony or a
misdemeanor in certain factual situations failed to meet the federal
equal protection requirement."6 It is arguable that if a prosecutor,
acting pursuant to a legislative command, denies the accused equal
protection because he may select the severity of punishment, then a
police officer may likewise violate equal protection when he determines,
contrary to legislative command, whether certain conduct is criminal
at all. (Actions of police officers constitute state action,"7 even if they
go beyond state-authorized action."8 ) The Supreme Court spoke of a
similar situation, and a parallel problem, in an early case:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet,
if it is applied... with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically
to make unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in similar
circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still
within the prohibition of the Constitution. 9
However, in more recent and more pertinent expressions, the Court
has said unequal law enforcement will not violate equal protection
35 The latter proposal is the so-called "implied consent" bill, which would condition
the issuance of a driver's license upon the consent of the applicant to advance sub-
mission to such tests. It is designed to circumvent constitutional prohibitions that now
require express consent at the instant the test is administered. Query: Would such a
law be constitutional? Consider, "The possession of a license to drive is a vested
property right." Moore v. Mac Duff, 309 N.Y. 35, 38, 127 N.E.2d 741, 742-43 (1955).
36 In re Olsen v. Delmore, 48 Wn.2d 545, 295 P.2d 324 (1956). The court also
found a violation of the similar provisions of WASH. CoNST. art. 1, § 12.
37 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
38 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
39 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).
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unless the discrimination is intentional and arbitrary, ° and perhaps
only if it can be shown that the police do not intend to follow up the
initial action with a general program of enforcement,4 obviously a
difficult burden to sustain. Furthermore, the fact that other violators
go unpunished does not produce a denial of equal protection,42 nor does
mere laxity in enforcement.4 3 In Kotck v. Bd. of River Port Pilot
Comm'rs,44 the Supreme Court indicated that enforcement determina-
tions based on police manpower and financial limitations do not violate
equal protection, so long as the classification devised is reasonable.
It seems that the courts, notably the Supreme Court, have diminished
the effect of the equal protection clause in the area of police enforce-
ment, and perhaps have forgotten that the aim of constitutional doc-
trines is "to assure responsible control over the scope and probable
regularity of exercise of governmental force."' Lost also is a recogni-
tion that too great a discretion conferred upon law enforcement officials,
[I]njects into the governmental wheel so much free play that in the
practical course of its operation it is likely to function erratically-
responsive to whim or discrimination unrelated to any specific determina-
tion of need by the responsible policy-making organs of society-and to
result in a significant number of impermissible public-versus-private-
interest resolutions which are beyond the effective discovery or appraisal
of the Court.46
An attack on the exercise of police discretion on the basis of due
process promises a similar improbability of success. The Supreme
Court has said that criminal laws violate the fourteenth amendment's
due process requirement if they do not afford to the public a fair
warning of what is prohibited. Mr. Justice Butler said,
No one may be required at the point of life, liberty or property to spec-
ulate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed
as to what the State commands or forbids.48
40 Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) ; Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953);
Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905).
41 See Note, 21 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 152 (1964).
42 Boynton v. Fox West Coast Theatres Corp., 60 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1932). See
also, Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Non-Enforcement, 49 IowA L.
REV. 389 (1964); and Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of
State Penal Laws, 61 COLUm. L. REV. 1103 (1961).4 3 Wade v. City & County of San Francisco, 82 Cal. App.2d 337, 186 P2d 181
(1947).
44 330 U.S. 552 (1947).
45 Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 90 (1960).
46 Ibid.
47 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
48 Id. at 453. See also Goldstein, supra note 30 at 547.
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It could be argued that because the effective law is that which is
established by the police, and is not that which is posted and of which
fair notice is given, then the notice requirement is not met, and the
accused speeder is deprived of due process. It appears that no court
has passed on this precise question. The probable judicial response can
be anticipated by examining the treatment that courts give to litigants
who protest the invocation of an old and long unenforced statute 9
The court usually recites the ancient American" rule that, "Only the
legislature can abrogate a statute, even if it has long been in fact a
dead letter." 1 The expectable result, then, is that the court will hold
that the law is that which is stated in the statutes, and that non-
enforcement violates neither equal protection nor due process.2
It seems, as suggested above, that such police action violates the
spirit of the equal protection and due process provisions. Perhaps the
more "liberal" attitude toward these provisions that has characterized
the Court's most recent decisions (perhaps, in turn influenced by per-
sonnel changes on the Court) will next be felt in problems of police
enforcement.2
Negligence per se may furnish the basis for tort liability arising out
of automobile accidents. Many courts have held that a driver who
violates a traffic safety statute is guilty of negligence which bars his
recovery, and which may render him liable to the other party.5 Will
these courts listen to an argument that a speeding driver who neverthe-
less drove within the higher "police limits," was not negligent because
he was not breaking the "effective" law? Would it not be fair to say
that the police have determined that the complained of speed is not
unsafe, and therefore that it cannot be per se negligent to drive at that
49 See excellent article on this point; Bonfield, supra note 42.
so See id. at 390-93 for comprehensive study of the rule in other nations.
511 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY COxSTRUCTION § 2034 (3d ed. Horack 1943).
.2 But cf., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), wherein the Supreme Court refused
to decide the constitutionality of a Massachusetts anti-contraceptive statute because
there had been no prosecution under it for several decades. The Court said that the
claimant could not show interference with his constitutional rights because, in effect,
he could not show a "law" that threatened them.
5 For a discussion of one important aspect of this recent attitude of the Court, see
Morris, Poverty and Criminal Justice, 38 WASH. L. Rxv. 667 (1963).
54 The then Judge Cardozo, speaking of the failure of plaintiff's deceased to exhibit
varning signals pursuant to a statutory command, said, "We think the.., omission of
the statutory signals is more than some evidence of negligence. It is negligence in
itself." Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 166, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (1920) (Emphasis in
original). The court in Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41 N.W. 543 (1889),
said, "[W]here a statute or municipal ordinance imposes upon any person a specific
duty for the protection or benefit of others, if he neglects to perform that duty he is
liable to those for whose protection or benefit it was imposed for any injuries of the
character which the statute or ordinance was designed to prevent... ."
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speed? The personal injury court will encounter the same question
that we formulated in considering disrespect for the law, police state
potentialities and possible violations of equal protection and/or due
process: "What is the law?" Is it what the police enforce and what
the people probably think is the law, or is it the command of the
legislature? The resolution of many personal injury claims will depend
upon the answer to this question. This problem is probably less
significant in Washington because our court holds that a speed limit
violation makes the violator liable or bars his recovery only if there
is a causal connection between the violation and the accident. 5
As was suggested in the beginning, unreasonable and unenforceable
legislative speed limits are the usual source of the discussed problems.
Under these circumstances police officials present persuasive arguments
in favor of the necessity of their exercise of discretion.
However, the answer appears to lie with legislative bodies. Their
task is to accommodate the group interest in traffic safety to the individ-
ual interest in preservation of freedoms and to minimize the sacrifice
of each of them. They must do two things. First, they must ascertain
the speed limits that most effectively promote traffic safety, and then
establish those limits. Second, they must insist upon police enforcement
of the legislative enactments, and provide a means for checking period-
ically the police performance in this respect. With these two steps
accomplished the police argument of justification derived from neces-
sity disappears. Because there is no longer a need for police discretion
to promote traffic safety, we need no longer tolerate any sacrifice of
individual freedoms: There is no longer anything to balance in the
scales against the interests of the individual.
It is usually not easy to secure such action from legislatures." How-
ever, both the Washington State Legislature and the Seattle City
Council" have recently reasserted their authority in the area of traffic
laws and enforcement." It is important that the actions taken by each
55 E.g., Mathers v. Stephens, 22 Wn.2d 364, 156 P.2d 227 (1945) (citing cases).
56 See BEUTEL, SOME POTENTIALITIES OF EXPERIMENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AS A NEW
BRANCH OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1957) ; O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.
L. REV. 299 (1963); and U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE (Bureau of Public Roads) REPORT,
su-pra note 9.
57 This is not an attempt to discredit similar efforts by other Washington municipal-
ities. Space limitations preclude an exhaustive survey of developments on the local
level throughout the state.
58 These efforts have been noticed in other quarters. The American Bar Association
awarded Washington State one of its two 1963 citations for "significant progress in
traffic court practices and procedures." for special achievement in promulgating a
comprehensive set of uniform rules governing procedures in all trial courts of limited
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of these legislative bodies have been based on a rational, scientific
approach, and have not been characterized by hastily concocted stat-
utes which were produced in an emotional response to a particular
traffic tragedy. The former is the better approach; the latter is
the usual approach. 9 Because the legislative groups employed the
"scientific" approach the resulting laws are probably more reasonable
and more realistic, and should be enforced because they are good laws
(heretofore this article has weighed the desirability of enforcing pos-
sibly bad laws simply because they are laws).
The 1961 Washington State Legislature established a "Joint Interim
Committee" to study highway problems, and directed the committee to
report and recommend to the 1963 legislature. Under the aegis of the
committee a citizens advisory committee was created."0 Spokesmen
from traffic safety organizations, from automobile clubs, from police
departments and private citizens constituted the committee.6 Through-
out the biennium the citizens advisory committee gathered data on the
effects various changes in speed limits produced on traffic safety in
other states,62 consulted with other experts,"3 and compiled their infor-
mation for a report to the legislature.6 The citizens advisory com-
mittee concluded, among other things, that traffic accidents could be
reduced if speed limits were increased to seventy miles per hour on
some of the new freeways. They recommended the increase to the
legislature. 5 The legislature carefully considered the report of the
citizens advisory committee, and conducted public hearings on its
proposals. Engineering data was also considered. The state patrol
was consulted.6 Only after concluding these extensive deliberations
did the legislature authorize the highway commission to increase the
maximum speed limit to seventy miles per hour on certain freeways.
In 1963 the Seattle City Council enacted a comprehensive new traffic
code."0 This enactment followed more than a year of intensive study
jurisdiction and for taking steps to eliminate the fee justice system. Reported in
Traffic Court Justice Vol. 4 No. 4, Oct. 1963 p. 5 col. 3.
69 An excellent book is devoted to the proof of these two propositions: BEUTEL,
supra note 56.60 Washington, sufa note 12. 65 Washington, supra note 12.6 1 Van Rooy, supra note 12. 66 Ibid.62 Ibid. 67 Still, supra note 12.
06 Darlington, supra note 12. 68 Ranney, supra note 12.
64 Ibid.
69 Ch. 16, Laws of 1963. Wash. Sess. Laws, Volume "A," Pamphlet ed., at 63,
RCW 46.48.013.70 Ord. 91910 as amended by Ord. 92153, effective June 25, 1963. Codified as Title
21, Seattle Municipal Code.
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and consultation"1 that was similar to the procedure that the legisla-
ture employed. The result was a complete modernization of the
sometimes incomprehensible, sometimes inconsistent, provisions of the
old municipal traffic code, and the emergence of a new code that is
geared to the necessities of urban traffic regulation for the late
twentieth century.
The legislature made a strong first step. The Seattle City Council
established a sound framework. Yet, neither should sit back and
conclude that the work is done. Perhaps the legislature could consider
a basic reconstruction of its traffic laws, 2 following the methodical
pattern that it successfully established in its action on the freeway
speed limits. The Seattle City Council, working through its delegated
mechanisms, must remain alert to constantly changing traffic problems
and patterns that accompany metropolitan expansion, and must be
responsive to the needs as they arise.
Partially as a result of their recent actions, both the legislature and
the city council are equipped to fulfill their responsibilities. The
highway commission's engineering division compiles statistics on traffic
speeds and traffic accidents and reports them and recommends to the
legislature." The state patrol performs similar tasks."' Seattle's traffic
engineer maintains extremely detailed records of traffic accidents,
traffic speeds, the effectiveness of regulatory devices and many other
related aspects of traffic safety. 5 He discloses his findings, and also
forwards compilations provided by the police department, in a monthly
newsletter that he circulates to all members of the city council and to
other persons who express interest in traffic safety. Also, the advisory
committees of each legislative body continue to operate under statutory
authority.
The need for continuing legislative action exists both to promote
traffic safety and to preserve our fundamental freedoms. The means
for continuing action exists. Let us hope that the legislators continue
to exercise their discretion so that there will be no occasion for the
exercise of discretion by police authorities. HA S ELDER
71 Massart, supra note 12.
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75 In 1963 more than 8,900 cars were speed-checked at 92 locations in Seattle. Traf-
fic volume, congestion and average speed are continuously checked at 45 key locations.
In addition, special speed and delay studies were conducted on six major arterial routes.
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